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FROM SELF-GOVERNANCE TO PUBLIC-
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: THE CHANGING
ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNET'S CORE
RESOURCES
Wolfgang Kleinwachter*
I. ICANN 1.0: THE ADVISORY ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS
According to its articles of incorporation, the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) is a
"nonprofit public benefit corporation... organized under the
California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation Law for charitable
and public purposes."' The articles oblige ICANN to operate
primarily "for the benefit of the Internet community as a
whole .... 2
The articles do not specify any governmental role in the
corporation.3 Paragraph 3 merely says that "the Corporation
shall... pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the
burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in
the operational stability of the Internet ....4  ICANN's original
bylaws (ICANN 1.0) did recognize a role for governments, but
clearly separated the functions of the ICANN governing bodies from
the relevant governmental institutions. 5  The original bylaws
* Professor of International Communication Policy and Regulation,
University of Aarhus, Denmark.
1. ICANN, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION OF INTERNET CORPORATION
FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (As REVISED) § 3 (1998) [hereinafter
ICANN, ARTICLES], available at http://www.icann.org/general/articles.htm.
2. Id. §4.
3. See id.
4. Id. § 3.
5. See ICANN, ICANN BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (1998) [hereinafter ICANN, BYLAWS
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preserved ICANN's independence from government interference
primarily in three ways:
1. Article V, section 5 made government officials ineligible to
join the Board of Directors. It said that "no official of a national
government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other
agreement between national governments may serve as a Director."
6
An "official" was defined as "a person (a) who holds an elective
governmental office or (b) who is employed by such government or
multinational entity and whose primary function with such
government or entity is to develop or influence governmental or
public policies."7  In other words, the original ICANN bylaws
provided governmental representatives no direct access to the policy
development process or to the voting procedures.
2. Article VII established a Governmental Advisory Committee
(GAC) but separated the GAC from the ICANN structure.8 While
other advisory committees were integrated into the ICANN process,
the GAC was designed as an independent unit, outside the ICANN
structure. ICANN 1.0 did not allow GAC liaisons into supporting
organizations for domain names and addresses or into advisory
committees, such as the Root Server Advisory Committee. The only
exception was that two of the four constituencies of the Protocol
Supporting Organization (PSO) were units of inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs): the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), and the European Telecommunication Standards Institute.
However, representatives from these IGOs did not represent
governmental positions.
9
3. Article VII, section 3 defined the procedures for interaction
between the ICANN Board of Directors and the GAC.10 The role of
the GAC was to "consider and provide advice on the activities of the
Corporation as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly
matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's
(1998)], available at http://www.icann.org/general/archive-bylaws/bylaws-
06nov98.htm.
6. Id. art. V, § 5.
7. Id.
8. See id. art. VlI, § 3.
9. For example, with a mandate from the ITU Telecommunication
Standardization Sector, the PSO elected Helmut Schink, a manager of Siemens
AG, as its ICANN director.
10. See ICANN, BYLAWS (1998), supra note 5, art. VII, § 3.
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policies and various laws, and international agreements."" Section 3
stated that the "Board will notify the chairman of the Governmental
Advisory Committee of any proposal for which it seeks comments
under Article III, Section 3(b) and will consider any response to that
notification prior to taking action."' 12 Section 3 gave the Board a
rather high level of independence by making GAC recommendations
non-binding on the ICANN Board. The Board needed only consider
the governmental advice before taking action.13 It could, without
explanation, reject a governmental recommendation.
14
II. INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENTS
An unusual relationship now exists between ICANN, the private
corporation with the responsibility of managing a core resource of
the global Internet, and the governments of the United Nations. This
relationship resulted from political and diplomatic battles between
private Internet stakeholders and the U.S. government, and between
the U.S. government and other governments, in particular the
European Commission and the ITU. 5
The rapid growth of the Internet in the 1970s and 1980s as a
global communication medium may be explained by its bottom-up
development by private stakeholders without any interference from
governmental legislation. While it is an overstatement to describe
the Internet's development as having occurred beyond governmental
control, neither a national Internet law nor an international Internet
convention channeled the Internet's development in any particular
direction. As Joseph Bordogna, Deputy Director of the National
Science Foundation, said in a hearing before the U.S. Congress in
1997: "When the Internet was a U.S. government-supported
research project, the original authority overseeing the registration of
Internet addresses rested on the consent of the governed."
16
11. Id. art. VII, § 3(a).
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See Press Release, ITU, Changes to Internet Domain Names Will
Encourage Competition, Foster Growth and Stability (Apr. 29, 1997)
[hereinafter Press Release, Changes to Internet Domain Names], available at
http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press-releases/I 997/itu-07.html.
16. The Internet Domain Name System (Part I): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Basic Research of the House Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong.. (1997)
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When Jon Postel, a researcher with the Information Science
Institute at the University of Southern California, developed the
Domain Name System (DNS), he did not ask the U.S. government
how to allocate names and numbers. Nor did he consult any national
government when he delegated the management of 243 country code
top-level domains (ccTLDs) to individuals or non-governmental
institutions in all parts of the world. Instead, he used a list of the
International Standardization Organization (ISO 3166) to identify
countries and territories irrespective of their political or legal status.
17
While nearly every country regarded telecommunications as part
of its sovereignty,' 8 most world governments ignored Postel's
delegation of ccTLD management to non-governmental entities.
Few governments considered the DNS worthy of attention because
few countries had more than a handful of registered zone files under
each ccTLD.
The U.S. government was the only government more than
minimally involved in the development of the DNS. The U.S.
government participated mainly by financing research, first via the
Department of Defense and later through the National Science
Foundation. Yet financial support did not lead to preemptive
legislation. In contrast to the development of telecommunication and
broadcasting media, where top-down legislation channeled further
development, such limits were never considered for the Internet,
even when its broader communication potential became clear in the
1980s.
The Reagan Administration (1981-1988) exalted deregulation
and thus rejected the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
(testimony of Dr. Joseph Bordogna, Acting Deputy Director, National Science
Foundation), available at http://www.house.gov/science/bordogna_9-25.html;
see also SUBCOMM. ON BASIC RESEARCH OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCI.,
105TH CONG., HEARING INDEX [hereinafter HEARING INDEX], available at
http://www.house.gov/sciencedemocrats/hearings/basic105.htm (last updated
Nov. 9, 1998).
17. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jon Postel, Director, Information Sciences
Institute, University of Southern California, to the Internet Community 7 (Mar.
1994), available at http://rfc.sunsite.dk/rfc/rfc1591.html (last visited Feb. 16,
2003) ("[T]he ISO 3166 list [is] a basis for country code top-level domain
names .... ").
18. Most countries already had detailed national legislation concerning the
allocation and use of names and numbers in non-Internet areas, such as
telephones and motor vehicles.
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Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) efforts to introduce global media
legislation for a New World Information and Communication Order
(NWICO). 9 The United States took the position-counter to that of
the Third World and the Soviet bloc-that information should flow
worldwide without regulation. Regulation was seen as violating
international free speech principles.
20
Though not a subject of the NWICO debate, the Internet evolved
in the shadow of the political mainstream. The Internet developed
towards promoting a global, unhindered flow of information. Article
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that
"[e]veryone has the right... to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers,",2 1 was
regarded as the only legal foundation necessary for global
communication.
The growth of the Internet in the early 1990s prompted the U.S.
government to become increasingly concerned about the political
implications of the Internet's development. While the Bush
Administration (1989-1992) had no intention of regulating the
Internet, it recognized the need to guarantee stability for a system
that had become an infrastructure for a wide range of commercial,
political, and cultural communications.
At the time, Jon Postel managed the DNS almost single-
handedly.22 Postel was recognized worldwide as the caretaker of the
U.S. DNS23 and was sometimes labeled the "father of the Internet.,
24
19. See, e.g., Thomas P. Sheehy, Stay Out of UNESCO, THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, Jan. 27, 1995, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
IntemationalOrganizations/EM403.cfm (discussing the Reagan
Administration's opposition to UNESCO's NWICO).
20. See id.
21. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 19, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html.
22. See, e.g., Transferring the Domain Name System to the Private Sector:
Private Sector Implementation of the Administration's Internet "White
Paper": Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Basic Research and the
Subcomm. on Tech., of the House Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter Transferring the Domain Name System] (testimony of Dr. Jon
Postel, Director, Information Sciences Institute, University of Southern
California), available at http://www.house.gov/science/postel_10-07.htm; see
also HEARING INDEX supra note 16.
23. See Net Mourns Passing of Giant, WIRED NEWS, Oct. 18, 1998,
available at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,15682,00.html.
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The U.S. government convinced Postel to institutionalize the DNS
management and to share the responsibility for its functioning by
entering into a contract with the U.S. government. Consequently, the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which became the
contracting partner of the Department of Commerce (DoC), began as
Postel's one-man organization. Part of the contract called for the
DoC to assume control of the A-Root Server, which was later
managed by Network Solutions Inc. (NSI, today VeriSign) in
Herndon, Virginia.
When the number of registered domain names exceeded three
million, Postel recognized the need for a more developed DNS
management system to go beyond IANA and his one-man show. He
firmly believed in limiting the role of big government and big
industry in the DNS management. Postel's first plan, to bring the
DNS under the umbrella of the Internet community and to introduce
150 new generic top-level domains (gTLDs) to broaden the territory
of the cyberspace, failed in 1995. Too many unsolved political and
economic conflicts became apparent with the emergence of a global
domain name market. At the same time, individual governments,
particularly the European Commission, began asking more serious
questions about their role in the global DNS management.
Trying to preserve the culture of the early Internet days and the
role of the technical experts in a more commercially oriented and
internationalized DNS management, Postel sought a broader
partnership to incorporate IGOs such as the ITU, the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and the International
Trademark Organization (INTA) into a globalized DNS management
structure. In 1996 and 1997, the International Ad Hoc Committee
(IAHC) produced a Memorandum of Understanding on gTLDs
(gTLD-MoU), which was signed by eighty organizations in Geneva
on May 1, 1997.25 ITU Secretary General Pekka Tarjanne
announced with pleasure that the ITU had become the depository of
the gTLD-MoU. Albert Tramposch of WIPO expected that the
24. Id.
25. Members of the IAHC have been the Internet Society, the Internet
Architecture Board, WIPO, the ITU, and the INTA. The gTLD-MoU can be
found at http://www.gtld-mou.org/index.html.
26. See Press Release, Changes to Internet Domain Names, supra note 15.
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self-governance structures proposed by the gTLD-MoU would
"eventually force changes in international law."27
Nevertheless, the gTLD-MoU also provoked significant
opposition because it excluded a substantial number of key Internet
stakeholders, such as the NSI and the ccTLDs. In addition, the U.S.
government withheld its support for Postel's plan to bring the A-
Root Server under the control of the ITU. Two months later, the
Clinton Administration (1993-2000) published "The Framework for
Global Electronic Commerce," which ignored the gTLD-MoU and
offered an alternative proposal for the privatization of the global
DNS management.
28
III. THE CLINTON/GoRE ADMINISTRATION: PRIVATIZATION OF THE
DNS MANAGEMENT
The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce
("Framework") was based on the spirit of private sector leadership.
It stated:
Though government played a role in financing the initial
development of the Internet, its expansion has been driven
primarily by the private sector. For electronic commerce to
flourish, the private sector must continue to lead.
Innovation, expanded services, broader participation, and
lower prices will arise in a market-driven arena, not in an
environment that operates as a regulated industry.
Accordingly, governments should encourage industry
self-regulation wherever appropriate and support the efforts
of private sector organizations to develop mechanisms to
facilitate the successful operation of the Internet.29
The Framework expressed the Clinton Administration's support
of "private efforts to address Internet governance issues including
those related to domain names .*.,30 It supported the establishment
27. Press Release, ITU, 80 Organizations Sign MoU to Restructure the
Internet (May 1, 1997), available at http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/
press releases/1997/itu-08.html.
28. See The White House, The Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce: Read the Framework, available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/
WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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of an interagency working group ("Group") under the leadership of
the DoC with the mandate of analyzing "(1) what contribution
government might make, if any, to the development of a global
competitive, market-based system to register Internet domain names,
and (2) how best to foster bottom-up governance of the Internet.",
3 1
The Group would also examine conflicts between trademark holders
and domain name holders with the idea of establishing "a
contractually based self-regulatory regime that deals with potential
conflicts between domain name usage and trademark laws on a
global basis without the need to litigate."
32
On July 2, 1997, the DoC published a "Request for Comments
on the Registration and Administration of Internet Domain
Names," 33 which became the starting point for a process that led
directly to the foundation of ICANN. In September 1997, Larry
Irving, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, appeared before the U.S.
Congress and criticized the IAHC as being too exclusive. 34 He also
criticized the role of the ITU and proposed instead that "[t]he private
sector, with input from governments, should develop stable,
consensus-based self-governing mechanisms for domain name
registration and management that adequately defines responsibilities
and maintains accountability. 3 5 Additionally, Irving said that "self-
governance mechanisms should recognize the inherently global
nature of the Internet .... ,,36 Therefore, governments should "take a
back seat in the registration and administration of Internet domain
names."
37
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON THE
REGISTRATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNET DOMAIN NAMES (1997),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/dn5notic.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2003).
34. See The Internet Domain Name System (Part I): Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Basic Research of the House Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong. (1997)
[hereinafter The Internet Domain System (Part 1)] (testimony of Larry Irving,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information),
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/congress/92597
_domnametest.htm; see also HEARING INDEX, supra note 16.
35. See The Internet Domain System (Part 1), supra note 34.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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After a series of congressional hearings, 38 the DoC published the
"Green Paper" in February 1998. 39 The Green Paper proposed the
foundation of a new private, non-commercial corporation ("NewCo")
that would overtake the functions of IANA. Registration of Internet
domain names would become fully commercialized and open for
competition. The NewCo would be incorporated under U.S. law.
The Green Paper provoked another wave of criticism, mainly
from outside the United States, particularly from the European
Union. The E.U. criticized U.S. dominance over the Internet and
called for an international representative body for future Internet
governance.40 "The European Union and its Member States would
wish to emphasise [sic] our concern that the future management of
the Internet should reflect the fact that it is already a global
communications medium and the subject of valid international
interest." 41 The E.U. feared that under the guise of globalization and
privatization of the Internet, the United States would use the NewCo
to "consolidat[e] permanent US jurisdiction over the Internet...
including dispute resolution and trademarks used on the Internet.
'A2
The E.U. also expressed concern that the work of existing IGOs,
such as WIPO and ITU, would be disregarded. While generally
supporting the idea of Internet privatization, the E.U. called for
greater involvement of the European private sector in the
management of the DNS.43
38. The House Subcommittee on Basic Research also heard testimony from
Gabriel Battista, CEO, Network Solutions, Inc.; Barbara Dooley, Executive
Director, Commercial Internet Exchange; Donald Heath, President and CEO,
Internet Society; Anthony Rutkowski, Director, World Internetworking
Alliance; and Andy Sernovitz, President, Association for Interactive Media.
See HEARING INDEX, supra note 16.
39. See Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and
Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 8826 (proposed Feb. 20, 1998) (to be codified at 15
C.F.R. pt. 23).
40. See Press Release, E.U. Council of Ministers & the Delegation of the
European Commission to the United States, EU Replies to US Paper on
Internet Governance (Mar. 20, 1998), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/1998-1/pr2O-98.htm.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. The E.U. and its member states sought
a balance of interests and responsibilities, so that the international
character of the Internet is recognized with respect to the relevant
jurisdictions around the world.
1111
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IV. FROM THE "WHITE PAPER" TO ICANN
The global discussion of the Green Paper initiated another series
of congressional hearings in March 1998. Ira Magaziner, President
Clinton's Internet adviser, defended the U.S. proposal before a joint
hearing of the Subcommittee on Basic Research and the
Subcommittee on Technology of the House Committee on Science:
"The purpose of the Commerce Department proposal is to improve
the technical management of the DNS only. The Green Paper does
not propose a monolithic Internet governance system. Frankly, we
doubt that the Internet should be governed by a single body or
plan." 4  Magaziner added that "the Internet has become an
international medium for commerce, education and communication.
We believe that it has outgrown the legacy system of technical
management, and faces increasing pressure for change from different
quarters." 45  He emphasized that the NewCo would not change
existing international law and would not interfere in the legal system
of other sovereign states. "Although [the NewCo] would be
headquartered in the U.S. and subject to U.S. law, as a global
organization, the new corporation would be subject to the laws of the
countries in which it does business." 46 He proposed that the board of
directors of the NewCo "should be balanced and represent the
functional and geographic diversity of the Intemet."
47
In line with Magaziner's comments, the U.S. government
modified its Green Paper and published a "DNS White Paper" on
We recommend that the US Administration limit its direct
regulatory intervention in the Internet only to those relationships
which fall clearly under existing contracts between the Agencies of the
US Government and their contractors and that all other decisions be
referred to an appropriate internationally constituted and
representative body.
Id.
44. Domain Name Systems: Where Do We Go From Here?: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Basic Research and the Subcomm. on Tech. of the
Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter Domain Name Systems]
(written statement of Ira C. Magaziner, Senior Adviser to the President for
Policy Development, Department of Commerce), available at
http://www.house.gov/science/magaziner-03-31.htm; see also HEARING
INDEX, supra note 16.
45. See Domain Name Systems, supra note 44.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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June 5, 1998. At the press conference convened for the White
Paper's release, Becky Burr, DoC spokeswoman, stated:
We are looking for a globally and functionally
representative organization, operated on the basis of sound
and transparent processes that protect against capture by
self-interested factions, and that provides robust,
professional management. The new entity's processes need
to be fair, open, and pro-competitive. And the new entity
needs to have a mechanism for evolving to reflect changes
in the constituency of Internet stakeholders. as
The global discussion of the White Paper was pressured by the
impending termination of the contracts between the DoC, the NSI,
and IANA on September 30, 1998. The DoC initiated an
International Forum of the White Paper (IFWP), which organized a
series of seminars and workshops aimed at drafting a legal
framework for the NewCo.
Meanwhile, Postel and IANA initiated a global online
discussion. During this discussion, a revolutionary legislative
process, akin to international law-making, developed. The virtual
negotiations that emerged differed from traditional inter-
governmental negotiations, which always took place among
diplomats behind closed doors. In an open and transparent manner,
hundreds of e-mails from individuals and from governmental and
non-governmental institutions worldwide played an active role in
formulating the NewCo drafts. Participation in the discussion
required no governmental mandate.
For three months, five drafts were circulated on the Internet.
Individuals and organizations from over fifty countries participated
in the discussion. "This process was about as public as it could
possibly be; the only thing that was not 'public' was the actual
drafting, but the results were there for the world to see every time a
new document was created," said Postel.49
48. Press Release, Becky Burr, Associate Administrator, National
Telecommunications and Information Administration's Office of International
Affairs, Press Conference Remarks, Commerce Department Releases Policy
Statement on the Internet Domain Name System (June 5, 1998), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/dnsburr.htm.
49. Transferring the Domain Name System, supra note 22 (testimony of Dr.
Jon Postel).
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Nevertheless, some criticized the online drafting and the virtual
negotiations as a global conspiracy of a privileged minority:
participants in the drafting process were only those individuals who
had both access to the Internet, and knowledge of the proposals and
the existence of these virtual negotiations. Postel defended his
approach: "Group discussion is very valuable; group drafting is less
productive.... We listened to everyone who wanted to offer
comments or suggestions, and we then tried to turn those suggestions
into actual documents."
50
On October 2, 1998, Postel, on behalf of IANA, sent the articles
of incorporation and the draft of the bylaws of the NewCo to U.S.
Secretary of Commerce William M. Daley. 51  The articles of
incorporation renamed the NewCo the "Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers." 52 Postel wrote, "[t]his organization
will be unique in the world-a non-governmental organization with
significant responsibilities for administering what is becoming an
important global resource." 53 When Postel presented the draft to the
U.S. Congress five days later, he recognized a number of remaining
controversial issues. 54 However, Postel also added that "[t]here was
one issue on which there seemed to be almost unanimity: the
Internet should not be managed by any government, national or
multinational." 55
On October 20, 1998, the DoC signaled its readiness to
recognize ICANN as the envisaged NewCo.56 However, the DoC
also expressed some reservations, particularly in regard to issues of
membership, financing, mechanisms against capture, the relationship
between the ICANN Board and other bodies of the corporation, the
50. Id.
51. See Letter from Jon Postel, Director, Information Sciences Institute,
University of Southern California, to William M. Daley, U.S. Secretary of
Commerce (Oct. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Postel Letter], available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/icann/letter.htm.
52. ICANN, ARTICLES, supra note 1, at § 1.
53. Postel Letter, supra note 51.
54. See Transferring the Domain Name System, supra note 22 (testimony of
Jon Postel).
55. Id.
56. See Letter from Becky Burr, Associate Administrator, NTIA for
International Affairs, to Dr. Herb Schorr, Executive Director, Information
Sciences Institute University of Southern California (Oct. 20, 1998), available
at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/press/icann102098.htm.
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global representation in the elected bodies, and the responsibility of
national governments for the ccTLDs.5 7  In a letter from E.U.
Telecommunications Commissioner Martin Bangemann to
Commerce Secretary Daley, the European Commission also agreed
in principle with the concept and the bylaws of ICANN.
The first meeting of the initial ICANN Board of Directors took
place on November 14, 1998, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.
58
Eleven days later, the DoC and ICANN signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU), which officially established ICANN as the
NewCo.
59
V. ICANN's GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ICANN is a private corporation, but governments played a role
from the very first days of its existence. The founders of ICANN
created the GAC as the institution where the nearly 200 governments
of the world could discuss Internet- and DNS-related policies.
60
Defining the legal status of the GAC is difficult. The creation of
the GAC is fixed in Article VII, section 3 of the ICANN bylaws.
61
The ICANN Board selected the first chairman of the GAC,62 yet the
GAC is not part of ICANN's governing structure. "Members of the
Governmental Advisory Committee [are] representatives of national
governments, multinational governmental organizations, and treaty
organizations .... 63 While the GAC operates independently from
the ICANN Board, supporting organizations and other advisory
committees, the GAC does not function as an independent IGO.
Under its operating principles, the GAC provides advice; it does not
make decisions.
64
57. See id.
58. See ICANN, ICANN PUBLIC MEETING DETAILS (1998), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/cambridge-I 198/.
59. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of
Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Nov.
25, 1998), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/
icann-memorandum.htm.
60. See ICANN, BYLAWS (1998), supra note 5, art. VII, § 3(a).
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.
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The GAC was designed to establish an informal mechanism for
communication between private Internet stakeholders and
governments without clarifying the legal relationship. According to
Article VII, section 3 of the ICANN bylaws, the GAC "should
consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as
they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where
there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and
various laws, and international agreements."
65
The hybrid character of the GAC can be explained as the
unwritten consensus of the main governmental players in the creation
of ICANN-Ira Magaziner from the White House, Becky Burr on
behalf of Commerce Secretary William Daley, Christopher
Wilkinson on behalf of the E.U. Telecommunications Commissioner
Martin Bangemann, and Paul Twomey on behalf of the Australian
government. They all shared the value of private leadership and low
governmental involvement in the DNS management.
A more formal arrangement involving all sovereign members of
the United Nations would have resembled, inevitably, a codification
conference for an international convention with a ratification process
by national governments. Such an approach would have blocked
further development of the DNS for years. The establishment of the
GAC avoided such a formal process. Nevertheless, four years after
its launching, the GAC resembles a de facto inter-governmental
Internet organization. The GAC's operating principles could be
easily transformed into an international Internet governance
convention. But like ICANN generally, the GAC suffers from a lack
of legitimacy. Although the GAC is open to all governments, no
more than about thirty governments take part in its work on a regular
basis. Russia, China, India, Brazil, and other countries with fast
growing domain name markets have so far ignored the GAC almost
entirely. Even though ICANN has held Board meetings in
Singapore, Ghana, Egypt, Chile and Uruguay, the majority of
governments from Third World countries lack either the capacity or
the interest to participate in the GAC's activities.
The GAC started its operation with closed sessions alongside
ICANN Board meetings. The GAC issued communiques to inform
the ICANN Board and the public about its proceedings. From its
65. Id.
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very first meetings, the GAC emphasized its position that "the
Internet naming system is a public resource and that the management
of a TLD Registry must be in the public interest."66 Later, the GAC
opened parts of its agenda for consultations with different ICANN
constituencies. The GAC formulated recommendations on a number
of various ICANN issues, including the UDRP, the at-large
membership, and the introduction of new gTLDs.
Naturally, the ccTLD question was a focus of the GAC's work.
In February 2000, the GAC adopted a special document on the
ccTLD issue which defined the relationship between a national
government, the ccTLD manager, and ICANN from a governmental
perspective. 67 The document emphasized that the ultimate public
authority over a ccTLD resides with the national government.
Section 5 of the GAC Principles states:
5.1 The relevant government or public authority
ultimately represents the interests of the people of the
country or territory for which the ccTLD has been
delegated. Accordingly, the role of the relevant
government or public authority is to ensure that the ccTLD
is being administered in the public interest, whilst taking
into consideration issues of public policy and relevant law
and regulation.
5.2 Governments or public authorities have
responsibility for public policy objectives such as:
transparency and non-discriminatory practices; greater
choice, lower prices and better services for all categories of
users; respect for personal privacy; and consumer
protection issues. Considering their responsibility to
protect these interests, governments or public authorities
maintain ultimate policy authority over their respective
ccTLDs and should ensure that they are operated in
conformity with domestic public policy objectives, laws
66. Communiqud, Government Advisory Committee of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Aug. 24, 1999), available at
http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/communique-24aug99.htm.
67. See ICANN, PRINCIPLES FOR DELEGATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
ccTLDs PRESENTED BY GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE § 2 (2000),
available at http://www.icann.org/committees/gac/gac-cctldprinciples-
23feb00.htm.
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and regulations, and international law and applicable
international conventions.
68
The GAC Principles provoked some opposition. The ccTLD
constituency of the Domain Name Supporting Organization, while
recognizing the role of governments, wanted to safeguard the ccTLD
manager against a misuse of power by a government in the
delegation/redelegation question. Other groups, such as the Internet
Rights Coalition in the United States, rejected this governmental
approach entirely and declared categorically that the "[c]ountry code
Top Level Domains in the Internet Domain Name System are not the
subject of sovereignty or international law."
69
The controversy over the role of governments in DNS
management was further agitated when the ICANN Board rejected a
governmental recommendation to reserve a number of second-level
domain names for official names of countries in the newly
established TLD information domain in 2001. ICANN's own failure
in a number of areas, including its inability to establish a contractual
arrangement with the ccTLDs and the experiences of ICANN's
at-large elections (which provoked in some parts of the world races
among nations to get the majority of votes for their "national
candidates") produced additional questions about the efficiency and
appropriateness of the concept of Internet self-governance among
governments.
The U.S. government remained silent during these discussions,
although the MoU with ICANN gave the DoC the de facto and de
jure role of an overseeing body. The original plan to release ICANN
into full independence after a two-year transition period failed
because ICANN failed to meet all the criteria specified in the MoU
by the October 2000 deadline designated by the memorandum.
Since then, the MoU has been renewed three times, always for one
year. It will terminate again in October 2003. The second MoU,
signed by IANA and the DoC, also faces the pressure of annual
renewal. Its present version terminates in May 2003.
68. Id. §§ 5.1-5.2.
69. Letter from Garth Miller, Dot CX Ltd., to Tom Dale, General Manager,
Regulatory and Access, National Office for the Information Economy 21 ((Jan.
25, 2001) (Appendix C: Brief of the Internet Rights Coalition), available at
http://www.nic.cx/acrobat/communication.cont.pdf.
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VI. THE ROLE OF THE ITU
The failure of the gTLD-MoU placed the ITU in a difficult
position. On the one hand, the ITU saw itself as the natural home of
discussions on policies related to the names and numbering system of
the Internet. On the other hand, the ITU recognized after lengthy
discussion at its Plenipotentiary Conference in Minneapolis,
Minnesota, in November 1998, that the private sector should take the
lead in DNS management. The Minneapolis Resolution, adopted
three days before the signing of the MoU between the DoC and
ICANN, did not refer to the gTLD-MoU, but requested the ITU
Secretary General to take an active part in further discussions about
the DNS.
The ITU's offer to contribute to the ICANN discussion was not
well-received by the ICANN Board. ICANN extended an invitation
to join the PSO, not to the ITU as an IGO but to the
Telecommunications Standardization Sector of the ITU. In an
environment of converging technologies, ICANN's failure to more
fully involve the ITU may impede the coordination of names and
numbering policies for fixed and mobile telephony and the Internet.
Issues such as electronic numbering, Internet Protocol version 6
(LPv6), and an internationalized Domain Name System (iDNs) will
be on the agenda of both organizations.
When ICANN started its reform process in February 2002, the
ITU made concrete contributions by recognizing private sector
leadership and by offering the ITU's expertise in the management of
names and numbering systems. At its Plenipotentiary Conference in
Marrakesh, in October 2002, the ITU sought an even greater role for
itself, particularly in areas with a public policy dimension.
At the Plenipotentiary Conference, the ITU addressed the DNS
situation by proposing a division of labor.7° While the ITU
recognized that private entities can be responsible for technical tasks,
the ITU claimed for itself the leading policy-making role for public
70. See Role of Administrations of Member States in the Management of
Internationalized (Multilingual) Domain Names, ITU Res. PLEN/5 (2002),
available at http://www.itu.int/newsroom/pp02/highlights/Plen-5.html (last
updated Oct. 17, 2002); see also Management of Internet Domain Names and
Addresses, ITU Res. 102 (2002), available at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/resolutions/2002/resI02.html (last updated Oct. 22,
2002) [hereinafter Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses].
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interest matters such as "stability, security, freedom of use,
protection of individual rights, sovereignty, competition rules and
equal access for all .... ,7 In addition, the ITU instructed its
Secretary General to consider the sovereignty of ITU member states
in regards to an iDNs.
72
Without mentioning ICANN or the GAC, the ITU invited all of
its member states "to participate actively in the discussions on the
management of Internet domain names and addresses .... ,,7 Yet,
despite the calls from the ITU Marrakesh Conference, the majority of
the 186 ITU member states ignored the GAC meeting in Shanghai,
which took place two weeks later. Further, the GAC Communique
from the Shanghai meeting, in which only thirty governments
participated, did not endorse the ITU Resolution.
74
VII. ICANN 2.0: FROM SELF-GOVERNANCE TO PUBLIC-PRIVATE
PARTNERSHIP
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, changed the
environment for the DNS management. By developing a new
security strategy to combat terrorism worldwide, the current Bush
Administration (2001-present) put the Internet into a central
position. The stability and protection of the Internet infrastructure is
seen now as a highly sensitive security issue. For example, access to
Internet communication and contact details of domain names
registrants and e-mail address holders has become an important part
of criminal investigations.
In November 2001, the first ICANN meeting after September 11
was held in Marina del Rey, California. That meeting reflected the
changes in the general political environment.75 The original itinerary
called for the At-Large Study Committee (ALSC), chaired by former
Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, to consider the future of the at-
large membership in Marina del Rey. Instead, that issue was forced
71. Management of Internet Domain Names and Addresses, supra note 70.
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See Communiqud, General Advisory Committee of ICANN (Oct.
2002), available at http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/internationalgac/
CommuniqueXIV-shanghai.pdf.
75. See ICANN, ICANN MEETING IN MARINA DEL REY, 12-15 NOVEMBER
2001: MEETING SCHEDULE AND AGENDA, available at
http://www.icann.org/mdr2001/schedule.htm.
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from the spotlight by the issue of the security of the Root Server
System.76 ICANN moved from an experiment in cyber-democracy
into a mechanism for cyber-security.
The proposal from ICANN President Stuart Lynn in February
2002 to reform ICANN responded not only to the obvious
deficiencies in the management structure but also reacted to the new
security challenges. Lynn recognized the need for greater
governmental involvement. 77 His proposal for a new public-private
partnership aimed at avoiding two extremes: a general governmental
take-over or a totally independent ICANN, governed by providers
and users of services.
78
With the new ICANN bylaws (ICANN 2.0),79 governments got
something akin to veto power. While the character of the
corporation as a private entity remained unchanged, the concept of
self-governance was greatly de-emphasized. The newly defined core
values guiding ICANN 2.0 stated that "[wihile [ICANN] remain[s]
rooted in the private sector, [it] recogniz[es] that governments and
public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly tak[es]
into account governments' or public authorities'
recommendations."
80
As with ICANN 1.0, under ICANN 2.0 no governmental official
may serve as an ICANN director. 81 However, ICANN 2.0 gives the
GAC the right to send a non-voting liaison to the Board.82 While the
Board can remove non-voting liaisons from other advisory
committees, it has no right to do so with the GAC liaison.83 If the
Board wishes to remove the GAC liaison, three-fourths of the
directors must vote to request that the GAC consider appointing a
different liaison.
84
76. See id.
77. See M. Stuart LYNN, PRESIDENT'S REPORT: ICANN-THE CASE FOR
REFORM (Feb. 24, 2002), at http://www.icann.org/general/lynn-reform-
proposal-24feb02-htm.
78. See id.
79. ICANN, BYLAWS FOR INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES
AND NUMBERS (2002) [hereinafter ICANN, NEW BYLAWS], available at
http://www.icann.org/general/bylaws.htm.
80. Id. art. I, § 2.11.
81. See id. art. VI, § 4.
82. See id. art.- VI, §§ 1, 9.1.a.
83. See id. § 11.2.
84. See id.
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Also, the Board is now obliged to "notify the Chair of the
Governmental Advisory Committee... of any proposal raising
public policy issues on which it or any of ICANN's supporting
organizations or advisory committees seeks public comment, and
shall take duly into account any timely response to that notification
prior to taking action."8 5 At the same time, the GAC "may put issues
to the Board directly, either by way of comment or prior advice, or
by way of specifically recommending action or new policy
development or revision to existing policies."
8 6
The new ICANN bylaws require the Board to take GAC
recommendations "duly. . . into account, both in the formulation and
adoption of policies." 87 If the Board rejects a GAC recommendation,
it must "inform the [GAC] and state the reasons why it decided not
to follow that advice."88 In such a situation, the new bylaws now call
for a mediation-like process. The GAC and ICANN must strive "to
find a mutually acceptable solution."8 9 "If no such solution can be
found, the ICANN Board will state in its final decision the reasons
why the [GAC] advice was not followed... ."90 The Board's
explanatory "statement will be without prejudice to the rights or
obligations of [GAC] members with regard to public policy issues
falling within their responsibilities."
91
In addition, the GAC has the right to send non-voting liaisons to
the other ICANN advisory committees and supporting
organizations, 92 thus allowing the GAC to become involved in the
bottom-up policy development process from the earliest stages.
Also, while the Board must periodically initiate an independent
review of other ICANN bodies, the GAC "shall provide its own
review mechanisms."
93
A greater governmental role will not make global Internet
governance easier. Conflicts exist not only among the different
private Internet stakeholders but also among governments
85. Id. art. XI, § 2.1.h.
86. Id. § 2.1.i.
87. Id. § 2..j.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. § 2.1.k.
91. Id.
92. See id. § 2.1.g.
93. Id. art. IV, § 4.
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themselves, and between some governments and their local Internet
constituencies. Strengthening the "information sovereignty" of the
state could encourage governments to justify restrictions of free
speech and privacy in Internet communication. Strong national
regulation of ccTLDs could lead to a new level of censorship.
Governments could reserve the right to instruct ccTLD managers to
remove unwanted second level domains from the Internet. Even
worse, governments could introduce legislation requiring the
approval of a public authority before a national citizen can register a
domain name in a gTLD.
At the inter-governmental level, the question of root server
control is thrust back into the spotlight. The thirteen root servers (ten
based in the United States) host not only sixteen generic TLD Zone
Files (gTLDs like .com, .org or .info) but also 243 ccTLDs (like .uk,
.tv or .de). The DoC is the only institution in the world that can give
orders to the A-Root Server Manager; other entities are left to hope
that the system will work. Consequently, a growing number of
governments would prefer a treaty system over a trust system.
VIII. THE REDUCED ROLE OF USERS
The losers of the present redistribution of power in cyberspace
are the Internet users. The original ICANN bylaws reserved nine of
nineteen director positions for at-large members.94 Five directors
were elected in 2000 by direct elections in which 160,000 individual
Internet users registered as ICANN members. Later, the ALSC,
under the Chairmanship of former Swedish Prime Minister Carl
Bildt, proposed to reduce the number of at-large directors to six and
to allow only domain name holders to participate in elections.
ICANN 2.0 does not provide direct Internet user representation
on the Board. The sole remainder of the original bottom-up policy is
an external "At-Large Advisory Committee" (ALAC), which will be
established in the new transition period ending in 2003.95 The plan
calls for five "Regional At-Large Organizations" to select two
individuals for the ALAC and five other individuals to be sent by the
new Nominating Committee.
96
94. See ICANN, BYLAWS (1998), supra note 5, art. V, § 1.
95. See ICANN, NEW BYLAWS, supra note 79, art. XI, § 2.4.
96. See id. § 2.4.b.
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The ALAC, when in place, can delegate one non-voting liaison
to the ICANN Board and five members to the Nominating
Committee.97  The ALAC can also offer advice to the Board;
however, unlike advice from the GAC, the Board is not obliged to
take ALAC's advice into consideration or to publicly explain why it
has ignored ALAC's advice.
98
Whether the strengthened role for governments and the
weakened role for individual Internet users will enhance the stability
of the Internet remains to be seen. Fifteen years of discussion on
Internet governance demonstrate that proposed governance
mechanisms that exclude main stakeholder-groups have difficulties
functioning. ICANN 2.0 reversed the triangle of power between
governments, Internet providers, and users of Internet services.
ICANN 1.0 entitled providers and users of services to take the lead
with governments on the sideline. ICANN 2.0 has empowered some
governments and some industries while sidelining the global Internet
users, the ordinary "netizens."
IX. PERSPECTIVES
We live in a transitional period where the old governance
system, rooted in the concept of the sovereign nation-state, is
increasingly complemented by an emerging new governance system.
This new system is global by nature and includes actors beyond the
nearly 200 national governments and their IGOs. To a certain
degree, ICANN is testing how a new trilateralism, driven by market
needs and user interests, could work. Somebody-governments,
private industry, civil society-must supervise. Bilateral
relationships in such a triangular environment offer opportunities for
shared responsibilities among groups that have both common and
divergent interests. Neither stronger government regulation nor
industry self-regulation alone will deliver the solutions.
Co-regulatory systems, designed according to special needs on a
case-by-case basis, combined with transparent bottom-up policy
development procedures, can produce frameworks that efficiently
97. See id. § 2.4.e.
98. Compare id. § 2.4.a, with id. § 2.1.j.
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combine stability and flexibility for all interested parties-
governments, industry, and the public.
99
Four hundred years ago, after the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution, the first industrialists realized that the governance
system of the time, based on kingdoms with an absolutist monarch,
did not satisfy the new needs of the Industrial Age. The search for a
new governance system in the seventeenth century led to a historical
political compromise: the introduction of constitutional monarchy.
The constitutional monarchy was, to a certain degree, a co-regulatory
system. While the king and the feudal institutions of the old system
still maintained some concrete power inherited by birth, new
institutions gained power and legitimacy through elections, such as
national parliaments and bourgeois governments. Interestingly, the
king always had "a non-voting liaison" in the parliament.
The present system of governance in the twenty-first century,
with nearly 200 nation-states, has functioned satisfactorily for
centuries. But with globalization, the system based on the sovereign
nation-state has started faltering when confronted with contemporary
global challenges. As in the early days of the Industrial Revolution,
the call is not to change the system but to increase its flexibility for a
changing economic environment. The call for co-regulatory systems
tries to combine the positive values of stable governmental
regulation, within and among nation-states, with the new flexibility
needed to meet the challenges of globalization in the Information
Age.
This combination results in a new diversification of power on a
global level. New actors create new institutions and move into the
new territory, filling emerging gaps regardless of governmental
mandate. National governments will not disappear over the next
century; instead, they will become merely one of many actors,
obliged to join into co-operative networks and consensual
arrangements with other global actors. At the same time, emerging
global actors, both private industry and global civil society (still in its
infancy), must not only prove their legitimacy, but they must also
99. See Wolfgang Kleinwechter, Global Governance in the Information
Age: GBDe and ICANN as "Pilot Projects" for Co-regulation and a New
Trilateral Policy? (2001), available at http://cfi.imv.au.dk/pub/skriftserie/
003_kleinwaechter.pdf.
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learn that the rights and freedoms they are fighting for are linked to
duties and responsibilities.
